The nonprofit starvation cycle is a debilitating trend of under-investment in organizational infrastructure that is fed by potentially misleading financial reporting and donor expectations of increasingly low overhead expenses. Since its original reporting in 2008, the phenomenon has been referenced several times, but seldom explored empirically; this study utilizes twenty-five years of nonprofit data to examine the existence, duration, and mechanics behind the nonprofit starvation cycle. Our results show a definite downward trend in overhead costs, reflecting a deep cut in administrative expenses partially offset by an increasing in fundraising expenses. The organization's size is instrumental to its behavior, with a sharp rise in overhead occurring when revenues equal $100 thousand, but diminishing at $550 thousand. Finally, the brunt of the cuts have fallen on non-executive staff wages and professional fees, which heighten the concern of ill effects from a fixation on overhead cost reduction.
Introduction
The nonprofit sector serves as a fiscal steward over resources that have been dedicated to the public good. This responsibility has been at times abused, resulting in a strong culture of accountability within the sector. The nonprofit accountability movement, which began with the New York City Nonprofit Project in the late 1980's, has grown significantly in the last twenty-five years as the quality of information, the strength of internal controls, and the expectations of funders have all become more rigorous (Bruno-van Vijfeijken & Schmitz, 2011; Haycock et al., 1992; Pollak & Lampkin, 2001) .
One primary manifestation of accountability has been norms around appropriate expenditures for non-program related tasks or "overhead" expenses; watchdog organizations exist that make overhead information available to the public for scrutiny. This practice guards against some flagrant abuses of public trust by unscrupulous nonprofits. But it also creates the conditions for a pursuit of financial efficiency that may cause a steady and self-perpetuating trend of cost-cutting which does more harm to an organization than good. This process has been described in the literature as the "nonprofit starvation cycle" (Gregory & Howard, 2009 ). This phenomenon occurs when an organization reduces (in reality or through creative accounting) the amount of money spent on overhead expenditures in order to gain a competitive edge in donor markets; over time, however, the constant erosion of infrastructure starves the organization of productive capacity. As the nonprofit sector becomes more saturated and competitive, the race to the bottom has the potential to get worse.
The starvation cycle was first noted by the Nonprofit Overhead Cost Study in 2004 (Wing & Hager, 2004) . In 2008, The Bridgespan Group also described a strong and self-reinforcing cycle which perpetuated a nonprofit's starvation of its own infrastructure (Bedsworth, Gregory, & Howard, 2008) . The "nonprofit starvation cycle" has been mentioned with regularity in the literature since then (Gregory & Fall, 2009; Huggett, 2012; Silloway, 2010; Tiller, 2012) . Despite the attention, there is little research dedicated solely to exploring the existence, duration, and mechanics of the phenomenon and many of the most vocal critics (such as Palotta (2008)) have relied on anecdotal evidence. Is consistent downward pressure on overhead expenditures truly prevalent in nonprofits, and is the trend ubiquitous across sectors and sizes? This research contributes to the discussion through a careful empirical examination of trends in overhead expenditures over the past twenty-five years, addressing not only whether the cycle is occurring but also which sectors and which costs are affected most.
The anatomy of the starvation cycle is explored through a longitudinal analysis of nonprofit overhead expenditures using IRS 990 data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics. In the following sections, we first present evidence for a general downward trend in overhead expenditures over the last twenty-five years, conforming to the expectation laid out in the starvation cycle hypothesis. Second, we examine the importance of nonprofit size in determining levels of overhead expenditures. Small nonprofits with revenues of less than $100k often have volunteer staff and very low overhead; however, as they professionalize, overhead grows rapidly between sizes of $100k and $550k, then declines gradually as revenue increases. This relationship is an important consideration when studying nonprofit financial efficiency. Finally, we explore how nonprofits are cutting costs by decomposing nonprofit expenses into functional expense categories and subcomponent groups. We discover that nonprofits are spending more on executive salaries and fundraising while spending less on staff wages; there are consistent and significant changes in the way that organizations adjust their budgets to accommodate the pressure from donors and the public. Policy implications of these findings are also discussed. 
Overhead Costs: Their Form and Functions
Overhead costs refer to expenses incurred from operations not directly related to programs; generally this is considered administrative costs such as legal fees, accounting fees and executive salaries in addition to fundraising costs (Bowman, 2006) . Occasionally other expenses are added, such as special events costs (Bedsworth et al., 2008) or depreciation (Krishnan & Yetman, 2011) , or the program expenses are studied rather than the non-program (Jacobs & Marudas, 2009; Tinkelman & Donabedian, 2007) . These expenses are often evaluated as part of a ratio, with the numerator being the total overhead costs and the denominator either total expenses (Bowman, 2006) or total revenue (Bedsworth et al., 2008) . In theory, this financial ratio could serve as an indicator of the efficiency of an organization in putting donor money to work funding programs; in reality, the incentives to report low overhead costs cause a myriad of unhealthy behaviors which are detrimental to the health and productive capacity of the nonprofit in the long run. How did a movement to improve organizational capacity and financial transparency become potentially counterproductive?
The nonprofit sector's fascination with overhead costs has evolved in three stages. First, though the "third sector" began to form as a distinct component of the economy in the mid 70's, the 1980's was the decade of growth for nonprofits (McGill & Wooten, 1975) . With this growth, however, came awareness of insufficient regulation or transparency: the New York City Nonprofit Project in the late 1980's found that 50% of the nonprofits listed with the IRS could not be found in New York, and 50% of the nonprofits that were found were not on the IRS lists (Haycock et al., 1992; Pollak & Lampkin, 2001 ). The National Center for Charitable Statistics began to compile information on the nonprofit sector, including archiving the financial data for those nonprofits reporting over $25 thousand in income. In 1996, charity watchdogs such as Guidestar began to publish financial data and opinions on nonprofit performance. This nonprofit financial data became easily accessible to the general public, even though some scholars express concern that reporting does not accurately reflect actual spending (Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996; Froelich, Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000) . Financial transparency means that potential donors can compare financial and performance indicators across organizations, increasing competitive pressure between nonprofits.
Reporting pressures also increased because of a growing number of highly-publicized nonprofit scandals. For example, William Aramony stepped down from the United Way in 1992 as his $1.2 million embezzlement from the United Way America came to light (Shepard & Miller, 1994; Simross, 1992) . CharityWatch describes this as a seminal damaging event in the relationship between the general public and the nonprofit sector (American Institute of Philanthropy, 2011). The Chronicle of Philanthropy claimed that similar damage was done to the credibility of the nonprofit sector as a result of Ponzi scheme by the CEO of New Era under the guise of providing fundraising assistance to other nonprofits (Gibelman, Gelman, & Pollack, 1997; Moore, Rocque, & Williams, 1995) . Benjamin Chavis, who was executive director of the NAACP, mismanaged the nonprofit's accounts at least partially in order to settle a sexual discrimination lawsuit against himself (Berry, 1994) . When Gibelman & Gelman (2001) performed a news search related to nonprofits and their misdeeds, they turned up hundreds of articles . The breadth and pervasiveness of these high-profile scandals -from the late Karen Pletz of the Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences (Peregrine, 2012) to Greg Mortenson of the Central Asia Institute (Pearce, 2012) -further strengthens the argument that the nonprofit sector must be under close scrutiny. Since the sector relies in great part on special tax treatment, donations, and grants, the standard for integrity is especially high.
Finally, a heightened sensitivity to overhead costs has emerged because of the increased professionalization of the sector, including the adoption of management practices from for-profit companies (Anthony, 1991; Frumkin, 2005; Frumkin & Kim, 2001; Salamon, 2012) 1 . This trend has brought pressures from both inside and outside of the firm to adopt more formal tools and techniques. Internally, though professionals have long had a role in the nonprofit sector, this was often from the vantage of consultant services while the primary labor was done by volunteers (Karl, 1998; McKenna, 2006) . In the past two decades nonprofits have developed highly-professional staffs with internal management techniques and performance metrics, often to please funders (Smith & Lipsky, 1995) . The Financial Times reports that many nonprofit staff members are returning to school to earn an MBA in order to satisfy the industry's new quantitative focus (Murray, 2008) . A popular book on forming a nonprofit encourages the adaptation of several concepts and tools from for-profit entrepreneurship to the nonprofit context (Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 2001 ). However, several scholars have suggested that the increasing use of professional staff members and ideals will distort the nonprofit culture, pulling procedural focus away from volunteerism and group cohesion (Frumkin, 2005; Kreutzer & Jäger, 2011; Skocpol, 2003) . External forces also continue to provide a strong influence on nonprofit operation. Partnerships between the nonprofit and private sector continue to grow, which can encourage common ways of communicating and integrating while retaining each organization's unique advantage (Austin, 2000; Dorado, Giles, & Welch, 2009; Eisenberg & Eschenfelder, 2009; Selsky & Parker, 2005) ; further, many nonprofit firms face a competitive mixed market, especially with the new wave of for-profit social enterprise. The competitive market pressure causes firms of all forms to struggle for margin, whether that surplus is headed for shareholders, reinvestment, or the expansion of program impact. Further, mixed markets of both non-and for-profit participants require nonprofits to trim down to a point where their often more expense product could compete, despite the benefits of favorable regulatory policy (Liu & Weinberg, 2004) or nonprofit product differentiation (Oster, 2010 ) as a selling point. As Hwang and Powell (2009) note, the increasing pressure from stakeholders, politicians, venture philanthropists, and social enterprise is causing a "rationalization" of the nonprofit corpus.
These three factors coupled with the increased availability of financial information on nonprofit agencies led to a surge of interest in overhead costs. The most comprehensive analysis of nonprofit overhead costs is the Overhead Cost Study conducted by National Center for Charitable Statistics and the Center for Philanthropy at Indiana State. Motivated by reasons discussed above, the several surveys, case studies, and analyses of tax form data were compiled and distilled into a series of reports describing the difficulties with reporting accuracy, unsustainably low overhead, and levels of fundraising efficiency (M.A. Hager & Flack, 2004; Pollak, 2004; Wing & Hager, 2004; Wing, Hager, Rooney, & Pollak, 2004) . A similar study funded by The Aspen Institute studied the relationship between overhead expenses and foundation grants, finding that not all foundations were averse to funding overhead costs. Though they did not find a statistically significant relationship between whether a foundation funds overhead costs and the quality of infrastructure, they did find that human services organizations which depended on foundation grants were more likely to report underfunded infrastructure (Rooney & Frederick, 2007) . Several studies have expressed concern regarding the overemphasis of low overhead and what such a preoccupation may mean for the industry (Thornton, 2006) ; even if the ratio itself holds no bearing on the success of the organization, the mere fact that such data is available is what gives it credence with potential donors (Tinkelman & Donabedian, 2007) . In the decade since the Overhead Cost Study first raised awareness about the dangers of anemic overhead expenses, are nonprofits truly starving themselves to be popular?
The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle
The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle (Gregory and Howard, 2009 ) is the negative feedback loop formed by three elements in the nonprofit landscape: competitive pressures, misleading reporting, and donor expectations. Competitive pressures against other nonprofits and, often, for-profit firms causes the nonprofit to slash expenses such as personnel development (Curran & Bonilla, 2010) and fundraising (Thornton, 2006) . This is done both to decrease costs in order to remain competitive and to appear efficient to potential donors. Financial metrics such as overhead ratio are often used as a rule of thumb for nonprofit fitness, and potential funders make heavy use of such financial information in their donation decisions (Mark A. Hager, 2003; D. Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007; Trussel & Parsons, 2007) . The appearance of charity watchdogs such as Charity Navigator increased the reliance on simplistic financial indicators such as the overhead ratio (Bruno-van Vijfeijken & Schmitz, 2011) . Competition for resources is fierce; as Bill Drayton, the founder of Ashoka, noted, "once you go from non-competitive to competitive, organisations have to join in the party or they'll be eaten alive" (Murray, 2008) . Such competition, however, sharpens the incentive to cheat, as Trussel discovered when he noted that firms facing lower surplus or delayed revenue (indicators of a tight market) had a higher likelihood to misreport its expense ratios (Trussel, 2003) .
As Trussel (2003) noted, this is not necessarily to say that overhead expenses are cut, however; several studies note that misreporting and underreporting of financial measures, especially fundraising and administrative expenses, is rampant (Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996; Froelich et al., 2000; Mark A. Hager, 2003; Wing, Gordon, Hager, Pollak, & Rooney, 2006) . Krishnan and Yetman (2011) found that as the normative pressures from donors intensified, so did the shifting of costs from overhead to program; this trend was reversed when regulatory oversight increased. The disturbingly high number of organizations that claim no funds are spent on fundraising is particularly suspect, and has attracted significant study (Krishnan, Yetman, & Yetman, 2006 ; Urban Institute & Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 2004). Further, claims that 100% of donations are dedicated to programs, such as those from Kids Wish Network's Guardian Angel Fund and Smile Train, are evidence that such tactics are at least expected to produce funds; both claims are justified by shuffling money from board members or private funders into non-program expense accounts, leaving the program accounts to be filled by public appeals. This is not unique to charities that rely on mass market public fundraising: organizations such as the Ploughshare Fund (Ploughshares Fund, 2012) and Charity Water (Charity: Water, 2006) emphasize that 100% of public donations go to programs, but this is due to overhead costs being covered by board members or other private donors. The true casualties in this reporting trend are the competing nonprofits. Whether the reduction of overhead expenses is actual or fabricated, this sets an expectation for donors that such numbers are actually achievable and sustainable. Like a price war, if one nonprofit in a market segment signals through their reporting that they are able to achieve a scant 5% overhead ratio, there is a race to the bottom in order to attract those funders. This could be a beneficial thing: the early overhead cost scholar in the for-profit sector, J. Maurice Clark, described such costs as the accounting manifestations of idle capacity (1923) . However, each downward step causes additional competitive pressure in the industry to decrease overhead, which causes more starvation or misleading reporting, which further reinforces the funder bias toward low overhead costs.
3 After a potential period of efficiency gains, a threshold of overhead will be reached where a nonprofit will have a choice to make: starve your infrastructure, fudge the numbers, or take your chances that the donor won't care about your overhead costs because you've differentiated your organization's services enough to command a premium. Since the latter option looms largest, starvation or creative accounting are often the answers, which decreases future potential as human capital and other materials necessary for organizational growth are sacrificed.
The empirical implications of a Nonprofit Starvation Cycle in the third sector are of significant concern. Donors, in the pursuit of the laudable goals of accountability and efficiency, will continue to demand lower rates of overhead. Nonprofits will continue to cut where they can, fudge where they can't, and sacrifice future capacity in order to be attractive for the present. Even more ominously, the chances that there will be a future for the nonprofit dwindles with extremely low overhead; Tuckman and Chang (1991) , the pioneers of financial ratio analysis for the nonprofit sector, considered organizations who fell into the lowest quintile of administrative costs to be at risk of falling prey to a financial shock. Fourteen years later, susceptibility to financial and program disruption based on the administrative ratio was empirically confirmed (E. Keating, Fischer, Gordon, & Greenlee, 2005) . Even in the for-profit sector, alarms are being raised on the loss of innovative potential and future prospects through the narrow focus of trimming overhead expenses (Denning, 2011) .
It is important to keep in mind the fact that current practices have evolved as a result of the culture and convention of the sector, not as a result of a meaningful body of evidence that links minimal overhead to greater nonprofit impact. Gregory and Howard (2009) make this point in their article on the starvation cycle, emphasizing the positive feedback process in cost-cutting behaviors that looks much like a prisoner's dilemma game in which everyone has an incentive to act in a way that results in socially sub-optimal outcomes. Increased efficiency can be a good thing for society, but when the cycle results in reduced nonprofit capacity and increased organizational vulnerability, it is perverse.
Methods

Data:
The data used for this study comes from three separate datasets assembled by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). All three of the sets are drawn from the required annual filings of 990 forms by organizations in the United States that have filed for tax-exempt status with the IRS. These filings are not a perfect method to sample the nonprofit industry: most religious organizations and any with less than $25,000 in annual revenue are not required to file. Further, the information on the tax forms often shows significant discrepancies between the information provided on the 990 and accurate numbers, such as findings from audits (Abramson, 1995; Froelich et al., 2000; Gordon, Khumawala, Kraut, & Meade, 2007 ; E. K. Keating & Frumkin, 2003) . However, the 990 has been generally accepted as the best information source available, subject to caveats (Froelich et al., 2000; Krishnan et al., 2006) .
The bulk of the analysis uses the IRS Statistics of Income Sample (SOI) dataset, which contains detailed records from 990 tax filings over a period beginning in 1983 for a sample of nonprofit organizations. For the purposes of this study, we limit the analysis to filers only of the 990 full form who both reported non-negative revenues on their tax return and had non-zero expense filings. The sample includes data from 1985 through 2007 4 .
Despite the richness in detail and breadth, the SOI is limited in its ability to generalize to the sector due to the oversampling of larger organizations. The weighting strata for the SOI have been altered twice, with the uppermost strata being wholly included in the sample and the lower being randomly sampled according to a schema that changes annually (Arnsberger, 2007) . Therefore, in addition to including organization size as a covariate, we include two additional datasets with differing sampling methods when discussing the impact of size on overhead ratios. The NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database (commonly called the "Digitized Data") is a comprehensive six-year panel of public tax-exempt charities that filed the 990 and 990EZ tax forms; the database is comprehensive, but the panel is short. Dependent Variable: Our dependent variable is the overhead ratio in an organization as determined by the functional expenses listed in their annual 990 filing. We consider overhead to contain both management and fundraising expenses, which is consistent with the literature (Frumkin & Keating, 2001; Frumkin & Kim, 2001; Gregory & Fall, 2009 ). These are compared to the total functional expenses reported. We acknowledge that there is discussion regarding whether total expenses or total revenues should be included as the denominator in this ration, but we concur with Bowman (2006) that the overhead ratio should contain expenses in the denominator in order to limit volatility which could be tied to funding type 5 ; additionally, since we consider size based on revenues as an independent variable, using expenses in the denominator provides a cleaner comparison and better insight than using revenues. Since the numerator in the ratio is a subset of the denominator, this also permits us to reasonably limit the ratio between 0 and 1, inclusive. The exact line items from all three datasets used to construct the variables is available in Appendix A.
Independent and Control Variables:
Our analysis focuses on the roles of three variables: organizational size, sector, and the year of study. The size of the nonprofit is measured by the total revenues reported for each year. The sector is based on the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities classification system containing 10 subsectors of the nonprofit universe (NTEE10); the base category for the regression is Arts/Culture/Humanities. 6 The year is a series of dummies which allow us to control for macroeconomic and sector-wide conditions, with a base year of 1985. The year is provided by the designated filing year of the 990 tax return and will contain some degree of error due to the different fiscal years ascribed to the filing year. Controls which indicate whether overhead is either a one or a zero are also included due to clustering at those values. Most organizations report overhead expenditures under 30% with a median rate of 14.8% and a mean rate of 19.8%. There are 7.7% of the organizations in the sample that report no overhead spending, and 2.4% that spend all of their budget on overhead. Organizational size has a strong relationship with total overhead expenditures and explains why some nonprofits spend 5% on overhead while others spend 25% (see the next section in the paper). Signif. codes: p-val < 0.001 '***', p-val < 0.01 '**', p-val < 0.05 '*'
Results and Discussion
The regression model confirms the sector trend presented graphically in Figure 1 . Specifically, the coefficient associated with the dummy variable for the year 2007 represents the change from the base year, 1985, and is statistically significant even after controlling for nonprofit size and differences across nonprofit subsectors. There are also significant differences across subsectors (Arts is the omitted reference group here). There are significant differences in overhead costs by subsector, but they have all experienced similar downward trends over the study period.
Since 1985 the average overhead costs of nonprofits have fallen by 2.5 percent. The primary hypothesis of the study is supported by this analysis -average overhead costs have been decreasing over time from 21.0 percent to 18.3 percent. We cannot say from the data directly if this is actual reduction of overhead expenses or just significant changes in how reporting is conducted; it is quite likely a combination of both. For a nonprofit with $1 million in revenues, a decrease of 2.5 percent translates to a reduction in overhead of $25 thousand a year. The practical operational implications of this $25 thousand shift in resources are not known. The category of overhead expenses is comprised of two sub-categories, administrative expenses and fundraising expenses. Administrative expenses generally refer to operational costs not directly related to programming, such as accounting fees or postage, while fundraising costs are those spent pursuing that activity. When these two components are examined individually, the overhead story becomes even more interesting: it is not the case that both categories fell over this period. Rather, administrative expenses fell from 19.1% to 15.3%, a change in 3.8 points. Fundraising increased from 1.8% to 3% over the same time, an increase of 1.2 points. So although overhead has only fallen by 2.5% over the study period, actual cuts are slightly deeper as some of the funds have been allocated to additional fundraising.
Overhead as a Function of Organizational Size
Organizational size plays a very important role in understanding nonprofit overhead (Pollak & Lampkin, 2001) . Small, nonprofessional nonprofits are often run by volunteers that manage operations and put together fundraisers. As a result these types of nonprofits have very low overhead. As nonprofits professionalize, they invest much more in operations and as a result ramp up overhead spending. Once they begin to grow, however, it is possible to achieve economies of scale and thus to begin lowering overhead. This pattern appears in the data when overhead is conditioned by nonprofit size.
Figure 6: Overhead as a function of nonprofit size. The average nonprofit run on little overhead until around $100k in annual revenue. Between $100k and $550k the nonprofits invest increasingly more in organizational capacity. After $550k, the we hypothesize that the fall in median overhead is related to economies of scale.
We conducted analysis on nonprofit size using the NCCS Digitized Data set, which has an augmented set of variables from the NCCS Core Data files that include overhead expenses by line item. Whereas the SOI files contain a sample of several thousand nonprofits, the Digitized Data contains all of the nonprofits that filed 990 returns from 1998 to 2003. The graph above was made by splitting the 251,305 nonprofits in the 2003 data set into fifty equal-sized groups that were binned by their total revenue.
8 Each point on the graph represents the median overhead ratio of roughly 5,000 organizations in each group. Note that the median overhead ratio is lower than the mean overhead ratio because of the influence of positive outliers and the truncation of overhead at zero. See Appendix C for discussion of overhead ranges at each point of stratification.
In the previous section we calculate a reduction in overhead by 2.5 percent over a twenty-two year period using the Statistics of Income sample. One might worry about a change in the composition of the sample driving the results rather than an actual sector shift in overhead cost structure. For example, we know that very small and very large nonprofits have small overhead ratios, so adding more of these two groups to the sample could drive down the average without any real change in sector behavior. These affects are addressed using organizational size as a control variable in the model, but if there are changes in the sample that affect overhead but are uncorrelated with size it could complicate the interpretation of results. Many evaluation studies will control for sampling problem using panel methods that follow the same organizations over time, but panel analysis is not appropriate here since nonprofit size will be correlated with time. Consequently it would be challenging to parse apart broad sector affects from changes in cost structure that result from maturation.
The Digitized Data set provides another control for issues that might arise because of sampling. The groups from 2003 can be matched to a similar sample from 1998 according to organizational size. Since the data set represents the population of nonprofits, sample bias is no longer an issue. 9 Matching was done by creating groups in equivalent revenue bins based upon inflation-adjusted revenue for both time periods. The average overhead for each group in 1998 can then be compared to the average overhead for the equivalent group in 2003. These results are represented in Figure 7 .
We see from Figure 7 that there is in fact a downward shift in overhead expenditures by nonprofits between 1998 and 2003, and this shift is statistically significant in the region denoted by the red arrows. Note that the changes are smaller than 2.5 percent, but this is only six years of data compared to twenty-two in the previous section of the analysis using the SOI data (1985 to 2007) . The magnitude of the changes represented here are not as important as establishing the downward trend in a way that eliminates the hypothesis concerning sampling problems driving the results in the previous section. In examining both size and time considerations, it is clear that there has been a downward trend in overhead ratios within the nonprofit sector. The best estimate is a change of 2.5 percent between 1985 and 2007. When examining overhead, though, it is important to be aware of the large influence that size has on the nonprofit cost structure. We turn now to an analysis of the categories of expenses that nonprofits report on the 990 forms in order to better understand how cost structures have evolved over the past two decades.
Subcomponent Expense Analysis
If nonprofit overhead has fallen by 2.5 percent over the past two decades, how are nonprofits restructuring their expenses in order to achieve these reductions? In this final section of the analysis we examine categories of nonprofit expenses that are reported on the IRS 990 forms using the SOI data. Each category represents a type of functional expenses, but is not broken up into overhead and programs for this part of the analysis. We are instead interested in general shifts in cost structures over time.
The functional expense categories reported on the 990's include the following variables:
 Officer Salaries and Wages -compensation paid to directors and executives of the nonprofits.
 Staff Wages -all salaries and wages paid to employees that are not executives.  Benefits -insurance and retirement benefits paid for all employees without a distinction made between executive level and staff.
 Professional Fees -Fees paid to accountants, lawyers, and professional fundraisers.  Operations -Fees paid for miscellaneous operating costs such as supplies, phone, postage, printing, travel, conferences, equipment rental, and occupancy charges. Figure 8 represents trends in nonprofit expenses for subcategories of operations as a proportion of total expenses. All of the sub-figures have been scaled on the same size y-axis so that changes can be compared across graphs. The graphs represent median ratios for each year in each subcategory.
The trends in the cost structure of nonprofits are clear. As a percentage of total expenses, nonprofits are paying their executive management staff more while cutting costs in staff wages and professional fees. Spending on benefits and operations has not changed dramatically over this period. Interpreting these trends is more subtle, however, since there are several plausible ways that the trends could occur. Officer wages, for example, will increase if executives were getting paid more, but similarly if nonprofits designate more of their staff as management. The nonprofit sector is notorious for having limited opportunity for promotion within organizations because of small size and lengthy tenure of existing executives, so perhaps nonprofits have begun designating program managers as executives instead of staff for human resource purposes. Professional fees, which include accountants, lawyers, and fundraising professionals, have also decreased. As the nonprofit sector has become increasingly professionalized, it could be the case that some of these activities were brought in-house; whether this means hiring the professional, which could help account for the increase in top management pay, or asking a volunteer to use do-it-yourself legal software is unknown at this time. These explanations are certainly plausible, but require additional dedicated research to establish causality. When taken together, the evidence suggests that the nonprofit sector is becoming more competitive. One way for nonprofits to compete for grants is through lower overhead (Ashley and Faulk, 2010) . The reduction in overhead is primarily achieved through reduction of staff costs, while at the same time increasing executive salaries and increasing fundraising efforts. There are many possible explanations for this trend, but we would like to suggest that this represents a public relations arms race. Executives play important roles legitimizing an organization and bringing to the nonprofit social capital ties with foundations and other significant donors groups. As a result, their value to an organization increases in a competitive environment, and they have more salary leverage. The ballooning of executive salaries in the for-profit sector will also likely have a spill-over effect into nonprofits since executives can easily move between sectors. Increases in competition for grants and donors will likely result in more intense fundraising efforts needed to sustain resources for a nonprofit, which could also explain the increase in fundraising overhead. As the same time that nonprofits are increasing their fundraising efforts, though, they are potentially decreasing their program capacity through reduced staff capacity. These behaviors would be a perfectly rational response to perverse incentives in a competitive nonprofit marketplace that emphasizes financial efficiency and does not have good information about program impact. This hypothesis is not supported by evidence from our analysis in this paper, but it also warrants some exploration.
Conclusions and Future Research
Scholars have referred to the existence of a starvation cycle within their work, but their analyses were based primarily upon case studies and anecdotal evidence. In this paper we have empirically demonstrated a steady decline in overhead expenditures within the nonprofit sector. It is consistent across all nonprofit subsectors and most nonprofit size groups (except the smallest and very largest). Overhead ratios have declined by 2.5 percent since 1985. This decline can be broken down into an increase in fundraising expenses by 1.8 percent and a decrease in administrative costs of 3.8 percent. In addition to looking at the trends in overhead, we examined trends in expenses across functional categories. We find that nonprofits are paying executives more while cutting staff costs. We were not able to determine whether these cuts resulted from a reduction in staff numbers or whether nonprofit employees are getting paid less over time.
We can say with certainty that there has been a downward trend in overhead reporting over the past two decades. What we cannot discern from our data is how much of this has resulted from tangible changes in nonprofit behavior (allocating more funds towards programs than administrative expenses) and how much is a result of changes in reporting practices, whether that be misleading and potentially dishonest reporting or just more sophisticated book-keeping. We also don't have a conclusive answer on the practical implications of reduced overhead expenses, but we have some evidence that it could be a potentially harmful trend. Tuckman and Chang (1991) posit that under-spending on organization maintenance leads to vulnerability; further, there is practically no evidence that lower overhead leads to more impact. Watchdog services like those provided by Charity Navigator provide a strong guard against egregious cases of financial misappropriation, but it should be noted that overhead reporting does not protect against many of the kinds of fraud that were mentioned in our study. More importantly, financial efficiency metrics are often used by donors in lieu of the information they really desire -data on nonprofit performance. But impact evaluations and reputational data are challenging and expensive to collect, whereas financial ratios are readily available. They have become a ubiquitous proxy for performance, though there is insufficient empirical justification for this practice.
For almost twenty years, government and nonprofit scholars have studied the "hollowing out" of the state; this trend of removing functional ability and legitimacy in exchange for cost reduction and efficiency has been a boon for the nonprofit sector (Milward & Provan, 2000) . This demand for efficiency in government is followed closely by a similar expectation of nonprofits. Miller (2005) noted that " [t] he inability of nonprofits to invest in more efficient management systems, higher skilled managers, training, and program development over time means that as promising programs grow, they are going to be hollowed out, resulting in burned out staff, under-maintained buildings, out of date services, and many other symptoms of inadequately funded overhead." As nonprofits steadily decrease (or misreport) their overhead costs in pursuit of the same efficiencies as hollowed government entities, care should be taken that the narrow line between slimming down and starving is found and respected. 
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